Semi-presidentialism in comparative perspective: Its effects on democratic survival (Mali, Niger, Mongolia, Krygyzstan).

摘要

The aim of the study is to contribute to the literature discussing institutional effects on the survival of young democracies with a systematic review of the effects of semi-presidentialism, a regime type that has been more or less left out of the debate, though it is adopted by a quarter of the countries in the world. Conflicting theoretical claims about the properties of this regime type, characterized by the existence of a dual executive, have so far not been subjected to systematic empirical and cross-regional inquiry. The study contributes to filling this lacuna in the literature through a series of statistical analyses and through two sets of case studies, each from a different region: Mali and Niger in West Africa, and Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia. The study also provides a rigorous definition of this regime type, as well as a full inventory of its spread across the globe.; Semi-presidential regimes suffer not only the specific dangers of gridlock within the dual executive; in addition, they can be plagued by the weaknesses of both presidential systems (over concentration of power, conflict between president and parliament) and parliamentary regimes (unstable coalition governments). This appears to be an explanation for why, on average, semi-presidential regimes have a poorer democratic performance as measured by the Freedom House Index, than other regime types. However, gridlock or government instability do not automatically result in the breakdown of democracy. Statistical analyses indicate that semi-presidential young democracies do not break down more frequently than other regime types. Institutional effects are mediated by the political context into which the new constitution is introduced, notably the fate of former incumbent authoritarian forces.; The study shows that semi-presidentialism is a regime type that does not appear to be particularly well-suited for young democracies. It is a constitutional framework that has some inbuilt flaws that would seem to outweigh the benefits of a division of the executive. These flaws may not cause democracy to break down. However, combined with certain constellations of political forces resulting from the political transition, these flaws can become fatal for a young democracy.