Strategic gaming analysis of competitive transportation services.

摘要

There is a worldwide trend towards private provision of infrastructure and deregulation of transportation services. One important issue in the development of such a privatised transportation system is to understand the interactions and competitive equilibria between the highway and service operators and the resulting level of services to the travellers. In this thesis, we study some of the situations that have arisen from the ongoing structural and technological changes in the transport industry which have not yet been explored. With the application of a game theoretical approach, strategic models are developed to determine any market equilibria as a result of the interactions between the operators in the new competitive market environment, taking into consideration users' travel behaviour as well as the profit maximisation objectives of the operators.; Firstly, we study the combined access and usage pricing problem on a private highway. A model is developed to model the travel behaviour and demand equilibrium of users on a private highway under different pricing schemes---usage-only, access-only and combined usage and access pricing, taking into consideration the congestion effect on the highway.; Secondly, we investigate the strategic interactions between a private highway operator and a private transit operator who uses the same highway for its services. Heterogeneity of travellers is taken into account by considering a continuous distribution of values of time. Demand elasticity arises from the inclusion of an outside virtual mode. Game theory is applied to model the possible moves taken by the operators in their interactions.; Thirdly, the competition between buses in a deregulated market is investigated. A game theoretical approach is applied to model the strategic interactions between the operators in the bus market. The conditions for market entry and predatory behaviour are determined, The impact of deregulation of the bus market is then assessed in terms of profits and social cost to the society, A hypothetical case is constructed to test the model. Numerical results indicate that deterrence behaviour of the incumbent is generally the dominant strategy.; Finally, the optimal location and pricing of a Park-and-Ride facility in a linear monocentric city is investigated. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)