首页> 外文学位 >Private v public authority in NAFTA: The procyclicality of investor protections and global governance issues.
【24h】

Private v public authority in NAFTA: The procyclicality of investor protections and global governance issues.

机译:NAFTA中的私人诉公共权力:投资者保护和全球治理问题的顺周期性。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

As states fiercely compete for international trade, there is growing concern about the emergence of private authority in global governance systems. States have delegated various aspects of their regulatory authority to private actors to facilitate the expansion of free trade in the global markets. This delegation of authority has generated the expansion of private international administrative law involving states. An unintentional, or perhaps intentional, consequence of this change in authority is the empowerment of private actors over states.;When states seek to compete in a globalized financial market and increase foreign investment flows, investors demand protection from "unfair" state actions in exchange for their investments. As regulatory activities and investment transactions increase so often does the volume of disputes between public and private actors. The result can be the development of an effective investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. This study examines the procyclicality of investor protections and global governance issues, with particular attention to the North American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) Chapter 11 on investments.;The current literature on global political economy has not yet fully explored the complex interdependency between states and private actors. NAFTA established an investor-to-state dispute arbitration mechanism to deter states from unfair national treatment and even expropriation. Under this structure, private investors may file claims directly against a state for monetary damages. Unlike national courts presided over by publicly appointed or elected judges, these tribunals consist of private individuals selected by the investors and member states.;This dissertation examines the expansion of private authority through NAFTA tribunals, as a case study of the accommodation accorded to firms in evolving patterns of global governance. The analysis also includes a review of relevant global political economy literature; a comprehensive analysis of newly released U.S. National Archives and White House documents related to NAFTA; an overview of the U.S.-Mexican Claims Commissions (1838-1946); and key information obtained through candid interviews with former senior U.S. and Mexican officials regarding NAFTA and its Chapter 11 tribunals.
机译:随着国家为国际贸易的激烈竞争,人们越来越关注全球治理体系中私人权威的出现。各国已将其监管权限的各个方面委派给私人行为者,以促进全球市场中自由贸易的扩大。这种权力下放已经扩大了涉及国家的国际私法。这种权力变化的无意或有意的结果是私营行为者对国家的赋权。当国家试图在全球化的金融市场中竞争并增加外国投资流量时,投资者要求免受“不公平”的国家行为的交换为他们的投资。随着监管活动和投资交易的增加,公共行为者和私人行为者之间的争端数量也经常增加。结果可能是建立有效的投资者与国家之间的争端解决机制。本研究考察了投资者保护和全球治理问题的顺周期性,特别关注了北美自由贸易协定(NAFTA)关于投资的第11章。;有关全球政治经济学的最新文献尚未充分探讨国家与国家之间的复杂相互依存关系。私人演员。北美自由贸易协定建立了投资者与国家之间的争端仲裁机制,以阻止各州免受不公平的国民待遇甚至征用。在这种结构下,私人投资者可以直接向国家提出金钱损失索赔。与由公开任命或当选的法官主持的国家法院不同,这些法庭由投资人和成员国选择的私人个人组成。本文研究了通过NAFTA法庭对私人权力的扩展,作为对在华企业所享有的便利的案例研究。不断变化的全球治理模式。分析还包括对相关全球政治经济学文献的回顾;对新发布的与NAFTA相关的美国国家档案馆和白宫文件的综合分析;美国墨西哥索赔委员会(1838-1946)概述;以及通过就美国自由贸易协定及其第11章法庭与美国前高级官员和墨西哥官员进行坦诚访谈而获得的关键信息。

著录项

  • 作者

    Rosero, John D.;

  • 作者单位

    Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - Newark.;

  • 授予单位 Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - Newark.;
  • 学科 Political Science International Law and Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 页码 393 p.
  • 总页数 393
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:37:17

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号