Political economy of anti-corruption reforms.

摘要

This thesis uses game theoretic models of political economy to explain why corruption persists in countries with democratically elected governments.; The first chapter studies why reforms aimed at limiting opportunities for tax evasion may not receive popular support. Consider a society where a section of population currently evades taxes by paying bribes, a practice that no longer will be possible if an appropriate reform were passed. In the model if everyone in the economy has the opportunity to evade, the reform will always be supported by a majority. But it may not receive enough support if only a minority can evade.; The next chapter studies the persistence of high level corruption and the effects of various reforms in political institutions. It analyzes a model of political competition between two candidates who differ both in ability and popularity among voters. The elected candidate's ability determines the cost of producing the public good. The budget constraint implies that taxes collected must equal the sum of public good costs and the amount stolen by the elected politician. The model analyzes effects of various commonly discussed reforms as potential ways of deterring political corruption, such as (i) imposing constitutional limits on tax rates; (ii) increasing compensation of elected politicians; and raising legal penalties for corruption. Under certain conditions it is shown that corruption reducing reforms will not be supported by either corrupt or honest politicians.; The third chapter pursues the question why honest candidates may not support anti-corruption reforms. It considers a model of electoral competition between three candidates that differ in ability and honesty: D (who is efficient and dishonest), H (efficient and honest) and H&barbelow; (inefficient and honest). If implemented, the reform would prevent any dishonest politician taking part in a corrupt deal. When the policy platform of each candidate is endogenously determined, it is shown that candidate H will vote against the reform, candidate H&barbelow; will support the reform, while D's position cannot be predicted.