This dissertation begins an exploration into the transition from non-existence to existence by investigating how we talk about processes and objects of creation. Two types of expression are important to talk about processes of creation: the progressive (i.e., the is VERB-ing construction in sentences such as 'Mary is building a house') and verbs of creation (e.g., 'make a cake' and 'build a house'). I explore the interactions between these expressions and with indefinite noun phrases (e.g., 'a house' and 'a cake') in three stages.;Stage one: I argue against the modal view of the progressive. The modal view claims that 'Mary is building a house' is true just in case all the worlds in which Mary continues to build a house without interruption are such that Mary eventually builds a house. Stage two: in light of my rejection of the modal view, I aim to develop an account of the progressive in which a sentence such as 'Mary is building a house' is true only if there is a building event with Mary as agent that holds at some time. One major problem for this account is that the truth of 'Mary is building a house' does not entail the existence of a house. I account for this by suggesting that verb phrases such as 'build a house' introduce a relation between an event and a property that is denoted by the indefinite expression 'a house'. Additionally, I define a predicate 'Goal' to capture the telic content of verbs of creation. Stage three: I turn to recent work that suggests progressive sentences with verbs of creation entail the existence of some thing even if that thing cannot be described by the relevant indefinite expression. After presenting a series of arguments against this proposal, I elaborate how the property account can be used to account for failure of existential commitment m progressive sentences with verbs of creation. Finally, I discuss the significance of this work with regard to the metaphysics of processes and objects of creation.
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