首页> 外文学位 >Sins of negligent omission: A study of ancient and medieval views on the relation between the intellect and the will.
【24h】

Sins of negligent omission: A study of ancient and medieval views on the relation between the intellect and the will.

机译:疏忽疏忽的罪过:研究古代和中世纪关于智力与意志之间关系的观点。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

The question of how blameworthiness and culpability for a 'negligent omission' can be ascribed to an agent is a particularly puzzling philosophical and theological problem. Negligent omissions are cases in which an agent fails to perform some action she is under some moral obligation to do. For an omission to count as negligent, moreover, it must be unintended by the agent. Nevertheless, the agent should have 'seen to it' that she not omit the action.; Cases of negligent omission are puzzling because they challenge the commonly held belief about being blameworthy, namely, that it requires a mental, intentional state in the agent. Stated in terms of Aristotelian voluntariness, they are problematic because the one who omits negligently does not have knowledge of that which she is failing to do when the omission occurs. Knowledge of what one is or is not doing, however, is essential to an Aristotelian understanding of voluntariness. Voluntariness, in turn, is required for blameworthiness. As a result, it is unclear how guilt, sinfulness, or moral failure can be ascribed to one who so omits. Nevertheless, most philosophers and theologians have persisted in holding such agents as culpably blameworthy.; This text is an attempt to understand how such negligent omissions fulfill Aristotelian conditions for voluntariness. It offers a non-traditional interpretation of Aristotle's akratic so as to better understand the 'knowledge requirement' for voluntariness. Anselm's action theory is then discussed. The theologically significant point is made that for Anselm, the first sin of a rational creature must have been a negligent omission. A step toward solving the puzzle of negligent omissions is then made by examining Aquinas's theory of action. Finally, long discussions of Scotus's and Suarez's writings lead to the constructive proposal that a particular Scotist-Suarezian framework can solve the problem of voluntariness for negligent omissions.
机译:如何将“疏忽遗漏”的责任归咎于罪魁祸首的问题是一个特别令人费解的哲学和神学问题。疏忽大意是指代理人没有履行其在某些道德义务下应采取的行动的情况。此外,如果忽略不计为疏忽大意,那么代理人必须避免这种疏忽。然而,代理人应该“见识到”她不忽略该行为。疏忽遗漏的情况令人困惑,因为它们挑战了普遍认为应受责备的信念,也就是说,它要求代理人处于精神,故意状态。用亚里士多德的自愿性来表示,它们是有问题的,因为疏忽的人不知道遗漏发生时她没有做的事情。然而,了解一个人在做什么或不在做什么,对于亚里士多德式的对自愿性的理解至关重要。反过来,自责则需要自愿。结果,不清楚如此疏忽的人是如何感到内,罪恶或道德上的失败的。然而,大多数哲学家和神学家一直坚持认为这些行为人应受谴责。本文试图理解这种疏忽遗漏如何满足亚里士多德的自愿性条件。它提供了对亚里士多德的akratic的非传统解释,以便更好地了解自愿性的“知识要求”。然后讨论安塞尔姆的行为理论。从理论上讲,对于安塞尔姆来说,理性生物的第一个罪过一定是疏忽大意。然后,通过研究阿奎那的行动理论,迈出了解决疏忽遗漏之谜的一步。最后,对Scotus和Suarez著作的长时间讨论导致建设性的建议,即特定的Scotist-Suarezian框架可以解决疏忽遗漏的自愿性问题。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号