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Bureaucracy and Institutional Evolution: A Case Study on Occupational Safety Protection Regime Transformation in China.

机译:官僚主义与制度变迁:以中国职业安全保护体制转型为例。

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摘要

New Institutionalism is short of convincing theory in explaining institution evolution. Current research of New Institutionalism focuses on pioneering new research approaches, such as from Rational Choice Institutionalism to Historical Institutionalism, Socialist Institutionalism and the newly emerging Constructivist Institutionalism. Through analysis on the existing literature, this research found that it is the argument between different research approaches that sets a barrier for digging into some key variables. This research focuses on "bureaucracy", the variable ignored by researches of all schools on institution evolution. The position of bureaucracy in political system generates its close relationship with political system. However, it is confused that New Institutionalism completely excludes bureaucracy from the scope of influence factors during the research on institution evolution. Rational Choice Institutionalism assumes that bureaucracy is rational. Rational bureaucracy is deemed as the target of institutional constraint without potential effect on institution evolution. Excluding bureaucracy from the institution selectors, Historical Institutionalism makes little analysis on structure and motivation complexity of the bureaucracy and treats bureaucracy as an accessory to the institution selectors, which has simplified the effect of bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Socialist Institutionalism that is seldom touches analysis on political system pays even less attention to bureaucracy. This research tries to interpret two issues on institution evolution through the bureaucracy as an independent variable: firstly, what is the driving force of institutional evolution, i.e. how institution starts and evolves? Secondly, why certain institution form will the results of institution evolution take on, i.e. where does institution come from and what factors shape the final selection of institution form. On the basis of the above issues, this paper theoretically assumes that the attitude of bureaucracy to institution affects the evolution of institutions. Specifically, birth and evolution of institutions are the results of bureaucracy support or objection, while selection of institution form is influenced by the preference of bureaucracy. Through tracking process of individual case, this paper tests the above hypothesis. The observation of the case comes from occupational safety protection regime in China. We track the entire history of the system and analyze influence of bureaucracy on all stages of institution development. In the case, institution evolution is divided into three stages. At the first stage, from the founding of PRC in 1949 to the end of 1970s, learning from the experience of Soviet Union, the Government established occupational safety protection regime dominated by industrial sector with "integration of production and protection"; in 1980s, labor protection system in the industries started to be shaken, and the labor sector assumed the regulatory power over production safety in all industries, while the industries sector reserved the power of management, where the powers of management for industrial sector coexisted with the regulatory power ; after 2000, government started to establish professional regulatory agency of occupational safety protection. Through several times of department upgrading and power expansion, the professional regulatory agency has gradually become a sector dominating occupational safety supervision in place of labor sector and industrial management sector. Why does Chinese occupational safety supervision system take on the above three development stages? Why has the safety management pattern dominated by industrial sector with "integration of production and protection" been replaced by the supervision pattern of non-industrial sector? Why is the supervision system not able to continue under the charge of labor sector? Why can the professional regulatory agency consolidate and expand its power? With bureaucracy as a variable, this paper analyzes the drive force to the evolution of occupational safety and protection system. The bureaucracy with influence is divided into central sector bureaucracy and local bureaucracy. The two are observed separately in relation to influence on institution evolution. Case study reaches three main conclusions: firstly, central sector bureaucracy has significant drive to early establishment and the advent of institutional evolution; secondly, by promotion and support, sector bureaucracy directly influences the selection of some institution form; thirdly, objection of sector bureaucracy and local bureaucracy may interrupt and change some institution form.
机译:新制度主义在解释制度演进时缺乏令人信服的理论。当前对新制度主义的研究集中于开拓新的研究方法,例如从理性选择制度主义到历史制度主义,社会主义制度主义和新兴的建构主义制度主义。通过对现有文献的分析,该研究发现,不同研究方法之间的争论为挖掘某些关键变量设置了障碍。这项研究的重点是“官僚制”,这是所有学校关于制度演变的研究都忽略的变量。官僚在政治体系中的地位与其政治体系有着密切的关系。但是,在制度变迁研究过程中,新制度主义将官僚主义完全排除在影响因素范围之外,这是令人困惑的。理性选择制度主义假设官僚主义是理性的。理性官僚主义被视为制度约束的目标,而对制度演进没有潜在影响。从制度选择者中排除官僚主义,历史制度主义很少对官僚主义的结构和动机复杂性进行分析,并且将官僚主义作为制度选择者的辅助,简化了官僚主义的作用。同时,很少对政治制度进行分析的社会主义制度主义对官僚主义的关注甚至更少。这项研究试图通过官僚机构将关于制度演进的两个问题解释为一个自变量:首先,制度演进的驱动力是什么,即制度如何开始和发展?其次,为什么某种制度形式会产生制度演变的结果,即制度来自何处,什么因素决定制度形式的最终选择。基于上述问题,本文从理论上假设官僚主义对制度的态度影响制度的演变。具体而言,制度的产生和发展是官僚机构支持或反对的结果,而制度形式的选择则受到官僚机构偏好的影响。通过对个案的跟踪过程,验证了上述假设。该案的观察来自中国的职业安全保护制度。我们跟踪系统的整个历史,并分析官僚主义对机构发展各个阶段的影响。在这种情况下,制度演进分为三个阶段。在第一阶段,从1949年中华人民共和国成立到1970年代末,政府借鉴了苏联的经验,建立了以工业部门为主导,“生产与保护相结合”的职业安全保护制度;在1980年代,各行业的劳动保护制度开始动摇,劳动部门承担了所有行业对生产安全的管制权,而工业部门保留了管理权,而工业部门的管理权与工业部门的管理权并存。监管权; 2000年后,政府开始建立职业安全防护专业监管机构。通过几次部门升级和权力扩展,专业的监管机构已逐渐取代了劳动部门和工业管理部门,成为了一个主要从事职业安全监督的部门。中国职业安全监督体系为什么要经历以上三个发展阶段?为什么工业界以“生产与保护一体化”为主的安全管理模式被非工业部门的监管模式所取代?为什么监督制度不能继续由劳工部门负责?为什么专业的监管机构可以巩固和扩大其权力?本文以官僚作风为变量,分析了职业安全与防护体系发展的动力。具有影响力的官僚机构分为中央部门官僚机构和地方官僚机构。分别从对制度演变的影响方面观察到了两者。案例研究得出三个主要结论:首先,中央部门官僚机构对早期建立和制度演进的到来具有重要的推动作用;其次,通过官僚机构的晋升和支持,直接影响着某些机构形式的选择。第三,部门官僚主义和地方官僚主义的反对可能会中断并改变某些制度形式。

著录项

  • 作者

    Jiang, Lu.;

  • 作者单位

    The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong).;

  • 授予单位 The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong).;
  • 学科 Political Science General.;Political Science Public Administration.;History Asia Australia and Oceania.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2013
  • 页码 13 p.
  • 总页数 13
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:42:19

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