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Market power and the sale of Ontario residential natural gas: An institutional analysis and a laboratory experiment.

机译:市场力量和安大略省居民用天然气的销售:一项制度分析和一项实验室实验。

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摘要

The Ontario residential natural gas market underwent a significant institutional change in 1986, after the federal government decontrolled natural gas prices. Currently, consumers may sign up for fixed-cost natural gas from a broker, or they may continue to be served by the regulated distribution company. This thesis examines the economic effects on consumers of the institutional change, and particularly whether or not market power was enhanced by the change. In the thesis, I first present the industrial organization of the residential natural gas sector, and explain the institutional evolution using an institutional economic approach. I then construct a model of the market environment, with sellers acting as middlemen in a well-defined Bertrand oligopoly setting with no production constraints and single-unit consumer demands. In this model, the only Nash equilibrium in the one-period game is the joint profit maximizing price, and its likelihood of obtaining depends on the nature of the cost of signing up new customers.; I then take a version of this model into the laboratory with human subject sellers and simulated buyers and run six replications each of a balanced treatment design under a unique information mechanism that parallels individual customer canvassing used by sellers in the naturally-occurring market. Treatment variables are: number of sellers, number of simulated at-cost sellers present, and presence of input cost uncertainty for sellers. I find that adding any seller to the market has about the same impact on market price, irrespective of whether it is a human subject or a simulated at-cost seller. Although increasing the number of sellers does decrease the market price somewhat, it does not bring about the competitive outcome predicted by the benchmark microeconomic model.; This research contributes to the literature on policy making and energy market design, as well as to experimental methodology aimed at policy evaluation.
机译:在联邦政府取消对天然气价格的管制之后,安大略省的住宅天然气市场在1986年发生了重大的制度变化。当前,消费者可以从经纪人那里购买固定成本的天然气,或者可以继续由受监管的分销公司提供服务。本文研究了制度变迁对消费者的经济影响,特别是市场变迁是否增强了市场力量。在本文中,我首先介绍了居民天然气行业的产业组织,并使用制度经济学方法解释了制度演变。然后,我构建了一个市场环境模型,在没有生产限制和单一单位消费者需求的明确定义的Bertrand寡头垄断环境中,卖方充当中间人。在该模型中,一期博弈中唯一的纳什均衡是最大化利润的联合利润,其获得可能性取决于签约新客户的成本性质。然后,我将这个模型的一个版本带入带有人类对象卖方和模拟买方的实验室,并在独特的信息机制下对平衡处理设计分别进行六次复制,该机制与卖方在自然发生的市场中使用的个人客户拉票相平行。处理变量为:卖方数量,存在的模拟按成本卖方的数量以及卖方输入成本不确定性的存在。我发现,将任何卖方添加到市场上对市场价格都具有相同的影响,而不论它是人类对象还是模拟的按成本定价的卖方。尽管增加卖方的数量确实会降低市场价格,但这并不能带来基准微观经济模型所预测的竞争结果。这项研究为有关政策制定和能源市场设计的文献以及针对政策评估的实验方法做出了贡献。

著录项

  • 作者

    Bloemhof, Barbara Lynn.;

  • 作者单位

    McMaster University (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 McMaster University (Canada).;
  • 学科 Economics General.; Energy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 258 p.
  • 总页数 258
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;能源与动力工程;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:41:31

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