Seeing through smoke sorting through the science and politics in the making of the 1956 Clean Air Act.

摘要

The 1952 "Killer Smog" left over 4000 citizens of Greater London dead in a single week. It was a highly visible environmental disaster, which pinned responsibility on government ministries to tackle both factory and domestic air pollution. Within four years of the Smog, the British government passed the 1956 Clean Air Act, which was designed primarily to prevent the release of dark smoke from the chimneys of private dwellings and factories, and is considered a significant turning point in the history of environmental regulation. Through the analysis of confidential documents from government ministries and Members of Parliament involved in the making of the Clean Air Act, this thesis examines the investigation and decision-making that took place after the man-made environmental catastrophe. I first show that there was a prolonged bureaucratic shuffle after the smog, as government ministries sought to determine which of them was responsible for taking action. I then demonstrate that, because the precise man-made causes and chemical composition of the Killer Smog proved extremely complex, officials deliberately simplified the public explanation, attributing the smog mainly to visible, and far more manageable, problem of visible smoke from coal furnaces and heaters. I conclude by exploring the cost-benefit analysis which shaped the clauses of 1956 Clean Air Act, and the many policy-compromises that had to occur in the face of difficult economic and political decisions.