This dissertation is an attempt to make sense of why (sometimes) philosophers reject past theories of x (reality, knowledge, morality, etc.) while they acknowledge at the same time that the theories being rejected contain philosophically interesting truth about x (philosophers will typically say things like: "Theory theta gets things wrong about x, but there's a grain of truth (about x) in it," "Philosopher phi is mistaken about x, but he's on to something," and so on). The answer I want to explore is partial truth, construed not intensionally, i.e., as truth "in part," but extensionally, i.e., as truth of a part (of an object). A description of the Statue of Liberty, for instance, that goes: "It's a tabula ansata, that is, a tablet evoking the law; on it is inscribed the date of the American Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, (and so on)" can be both rejected and acknowledged to contain interesting truth; the former, because only a part of the Statue of Liberty is being described, not the Statue of Liberty simpliciter; and the latter because that is a part of the right object (i.e., the Statue of Liberty and not, say, the Eiffel Tower). I suggest that something analogous, in a more complex way, can be seen to (sometimes) happen in philosophy. If this view is correct, I argue, an interesting explanation can be given of why (sometimes) philosophers have rejected past theories of x while acknowledging at the same time that the theories being rejected contain philosophically interesting truth: because those philosophers have believed the theories being rejected were partially true in the sense just sketched. As examples, I propose J. P. Sartre on previous theories of consciousness, M. Heidegger on previous theories of human being, and G. W. F. Hegel on previous theories of the Absolute (God). I conclude by suggesting that my model can be extended to additional figures in the history of Western philosophy, and that my model of partial truth can tell us interesting things about the nature of philosophy as a theoretical enterprise.
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机译：本文试图弄清为什么（有时）哲学家拒绝过去的x理论（现实，知识，道德等），而他们同时承认被拒绝的理论包含关于x的哲学有趣的真理（哲学家会通常会说类似这样的事情：“理论theta弄错了x，但其中有一个真相（约x），”“哲学家phi误解了x，但他对某事有所了解，等等”。我想探究的答案是部分真实，不是故意地，即“部分”真实，而是广义地，（物体的）一部分真实。例如，对自由女神像的描述是这样的：“这是一个平板式的平板电脑，它是一台唤起法律的平板电脑；上面刻有1776年7月4日的美国独立宣言的日期（依此类推on）”可以被拒绝或承认包含有趣的事实；前者是因为只描述了自由女神像的一部分，而不是自由女神像的简化文字；后者是因为它是正确对象的一部分（即自由女神像，而不是艾菲尔铁塔）。我建议在哲学上可以（有时）以更复杂的方式看到类似的事情。我认为，如果这种观点是正确的，那么可以做出有趣的解释，说明为什么（有时）哲学家拒绝过去的x理论，同时又承认被拒绝的理论包含着哲学上有趣的真理：因为那些哲学家已经相信了这些理论。就被勾勒的意义而言，被拒绝是部分真实的。举例来说，我提议萨特（J. P. Sartre）提出先前的意识理论，提议海德格尔（M. Heidegger）提出人类的先前理论，提出黑格尔（G. W. F. Hegel）提出关于绝对（上帝）先前的理论。最后，我建议我的模型可以扩展到西方哲学史上的其他人物，而我的部分真理模型可以告诉我们有关哲学作为理论企业的本质的有趣的事情。
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