Stronger medicine for stronger dogmatisms: Pyrrhonian skepticism and the problem of the criterion.

摘要

In this essay, I seek to address a number of issues in the interpretation of Sextus Empiricus, and the subsequent reception of Pyrrhonian Skepticism in contemporary philosophy. In chapter 1, I offer an introduction to the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, providing a framework within which to understand the problems posed by the Pyrrhonian Skepticism for a criterion of truth. In chapter 2, I examine the modern reception of the problem, called "The Problem of the Criterion" by Roderick Chisholm. I also examine the connection between Chisholm's problem and Ancient Pyrrhonism, drawing on the work of Robert Amico. In Chapter 3, I examine the arguments against Sextus' version of the problem by both Amico and Michael Williams. Here the question is raised whether the problem in Amico and Williams tracks the specific methods employed by Sextus. In chapter 4, I examine some suggested interpretations of the text put forward by Benson Mates, Anthony Long, and Jonathan Barnes. In chapter 5, I examine another interpretation by R.J. Hankinson, and suggest that it captures a feature of the text that is important for understanding the problem. In chapter 6, I then provide my own reading of the text, and then draw a number of consequences of my reading for both the understanding of Sextus' Pyrrhonism, as well as contemporary attacks upon contemporary Pyrrhonian skepticism. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)