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Three essays on bidding in the construction industry.

机译:关于建筑业招标的三篇论文。

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摘要

These three essays examine aspects of contractor bidding in construction.;The first paper, "Timing and Bundling Projects to Offset the Limitations on the Number of Bidders Created by Contractor Prequalification on Public Works," examines the effect of increased numbers of competitors in an auction on the dispersion between the lowest and the second lowest bid. This paper informs the discussion around reforming public procurement policies by moving away from an open bidding process towards a filtered auction where general contractors are prequalified in order to bid. While prequalification may have the benefit of reducing the prospect of performance problems on projects, it necessarily reduces the number of bidders on a project.;The second paper, "Aggressive Entrant Bidding in Construction: An Artifact of Greater Entrant Uncertainty Regarding the True Cost of Construction," using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and quantile regression models examines the previously discovered phenomenon of aggressive bidding on the part of entrant contractors with a sample of subcontractors. This paper finds aggressive bidding behavior of entrants to be an artifact of greater entrant uncertainty regarding the true cost of construction. A wider dispersion of entrant bids at both ends of the bid distribution effectively results in relatively aggressive entrant tenders at the low end (i.e., the operative end) of bids.;The third paper, "New Firms' Bidding Behavior and Survival: Evidence from Auctions of Utah Construction Industry," examines an aphorism heard from a mason contractor who had been in business for more than 30 years in Utah. Using a survival model applied to 35 years of panel data on subcontractor bidding in construction, this paper examines the role of aggressive bidding on the survival prospects of firms. The paper finds some evidence to support the notion that long-lived contractors do not stray far from the mean of auction bids. Because researchers have not previously had available to them panel data of this length, this paper is the first contribution to the study of the relationship between bidding behavior and the longevity of construction firms.
机译:这三篇文章探讨了承包商在建筑工程中的投标方面。第一篇论文“抵消承包商对公共工程资格预审产生的投标人数量的限制的时间和捆绑项目”研究了拍卖中竞争者数量增加的影响最低和第二最低出价之间的差异。本文为围绕公共采购政策改革的讨论提供了信息,其方式是从公开招标过程转向过滤式拍卖,在这种拍卖中,总承包商要经过资格预审才能投标。尽管资格预审可能会减少项目中出现性能问题的可能性,但它必然会减少项目中的投标人数量。;第二篇论文“建设中的积极竞争者竞标:关于真实成本的更大参与者不确定性的伪像” “使用普通最小二乘(OLS)和分位数回归模型进行的构建”,通过分包商的样本,检验了先前发现的新进入的承包商主动竞标的现象。本文发现,进入者的竞标行为是关于进入者真实建筑成本的更大不确定性的假象。投标分布两端的新进投标者分散程度较大,实际上导致投标的低端(即操作端)出现相对激进的新投标。第三篇论文,“新公司的投标行为和生存:证据来自犹他州建筑业的拍卖”,考察了在犹他州经营超过30年的泥瓦匠承包商的格言。本文使用生存模型对建筑承包商分包招标的35年面板数据进行了研究,研究了积极招标对企业生存前景的作用。该论文找到了一些证据来支持长期承包商没有偏离拍卖报价均值的观点。由于研究人员以前尚未获得过如此长的面板数据,因此本文是对投标行为与建筑公司寿命之间关系的研究的第一篇贡献。

著录项

  • 作者

    Li, Sheng.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Utah.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Utah.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2006
  • 页码 78 p.
  • 总页数 78
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;
  • 关键词

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