In this thesis, we focus on the rationing polices for the hotel room inventory control problems. Our study begins with a brief overview of revenue management in hotel industry, emphasizing the importance of room inventory control in revenue management problems. Mathematical models for controlling the room inventory in the literature are then reviewed along with recently developed game theoretic applications in revenue management. In game theoretic context, we establish three types of models to solve the hotel room inventory control problem in three different situations: (1) two-player two-fare-class static single-period game with complete information; (2) two-player two-fare-class dynamic multiple-period game with complete information; and (3) two-player two-fare-class single-period game with incomplete information.;In the first situation, we find the existence of unique Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium in the non-cooperative case. We provide the exact forms for these equilibria and corresponding conditions. Next, under the dynamic game settings, we provide the sufficient conditions for the unique Nash equilibrium. In the last situation, we consider the static single-period games with incomplete information and discuss the optimal strategies for the uninformed case, secret information case, private information case and public information case. The unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in each case is found. We then analyze the values of different types of information and study their relations in different situations. Under each game theoretic setting, we present the managerial implications of our solutions along with the numerical examples. The thesis is concluded by a discussion of how game theory can is useful in hotel industry, and its relationship to other topics in revenue management.
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