The role of natural law and virtue in the moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.

摘要

I investigate Aquinas' understanding of the role of and the relationship between natural law and virtue in light of the contemporary debate as to which is foundational. The study has four parts. The first part examines and responds to various strategies for avoiding and approaching this problem. First, it is wrongly avoided by those not recognizing the need to account for the relationship between natural law and virtue; second, the possibility of avoiding it is established by those who reject the notion of natural law (Ch. II), since this allows Aquinas' understanding of the moral life to be articulated solely in terms of virtue. Yet one cannot assess the merit of these objections or excise natural law from an account of Aquinas without first understanding what Aquinas means by natural law. Next, I show that it is possible to investigate Aquinas' understanding of natural law and virtue without following the theological order of Aquinas' text or doing moral theology (Ch. III). In the second part I provide an overview of the interpretive disagreements with respect to virtue (Ch. IV) and natural law (Ch. V) through a survey of recent work on Aquinas; comparing and contrasting these studies makes it possible to adjudicate between them as interpretations of Aquinas. In the third part I expound the texts concerning virtue and natural law in the Summa theologiae. In discussing virtue, Aquinas explicitly allows, contrary to virtue ethics readings, that one need not possess virtue in order to make correct moral judgments, and indicates that universal principles of reason are foundational for such judgments (Ch. VI). In the treatise on law, Aquinas identifies a network of intelligibly differentiated levels of natural law precepts that can be known by all, and not only by the virtuous (Ch. VII). In the fourth part I bring these results together in a solution to this study's central question concerning the relation between natural law and virtue by delineating how natural law enables us to make moral determinations and judgments of conscience, and hence to acquire virtue (Ch. VIII). Virtue, then, cannot be properly understood in isolation from or as more fundamental than natural law. I conclude by assessing alternative virtue ethics readings of Aquinas, and by answering the objections of Ch. II against natural law (Ch. IX).