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Domestic tax policy and international joint ventures.

机译:国内税收政策和国际合资企业。

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摘要

This study mainly explores how a multinational firm sets up a joint venture (JV) in a developing country. The questions associated with this issue are how to select the partner and how to split the profit. Unlike the normal methodology in the existing literature, we develop a three-stage model to examine these questions.; In the first chapter, we summarize the past literature and present the structure of this dissertation.; In the second chapter, we develop a three-stage game to analyze how a joint venture allocates profits in a one-country model. When there are two domestic firms in that country, the foreign firm faces an option of partner choice. In order to get a favorable tax treatment, the foreign firm gives a large part of profits to the domestic partner. Also, it prefers to choose the more efficient of the two firms as JV partner. Both firms would like to join the JV. The host government attitude to the JV depends of the efficiency level of the JV.; In the third chapter, we consider the case of two countries. Each country has one domestic firm. These two countries operate in an integrated market. The foreign firm still offers a large share of profits to the domestic partner and it likes to locate in the country that has a more efficient firm, (Firm A). Whether the domestic firm accepts the offer depends on how efficient the foreign firm is. When the foreign firm is not very efficient, the more efficient domestic firm will turn down the offer, and the JV takes place in the country which has the less efficient domestic firm. When the foreign firm is very efficient, the more efficient firm will accept the offer, and the JV will take place in the country which has the more efficient domestic firm.; In the fourth chapter, we still consider a case of two countries. However, this time, these two countries are in a segmented market. A part of each firm's produce gets exported to the other country. Shipping incurs transportation cost. In this scenario, we could not solve explicitly for the optimal profit share. We use Implicit Function Theorem to obtain some results. We find the foreign firm will prefer the more efficient firm and this partnership will also be in the interest of the more efficient domestic firm.
机译:这项研究主要探讨跨国公司如何在发展中国家建立合资企业(JV)。与该问题相关的问题是如何选择合作伙伴以及如何分配利润。与现有文献中的常规方法不同,我们开发了一个三阶段模型来研究这些问题。在第一章中,我们总结了过去的文献,并提出了本文的结构。在第二章中,我们开发了一个三阶段博弈,以分析合资企业如何在一个国家模型中分配利润。当该国有两家国内公司时,外国公司将面临选择合伙人的选择。为了获得优惠的税收待遇,外国公司将很大一部分利润提供给了国内合伙人。此外,它更喜欢选择两家公司中效率更高的公司作为合资伙伴。两家公司都想加入合资企业。东道国政府对合资企业的态度取决于合资企业的效率水平。在第三章中,我们考虑两个国家的情况。每个国家都有一个国内公司。这两个国家在一个集成的市场中运作。外国公司仍然向国内合作伙伴提供大量利润,它喜欢在效率更高的公司(公司A)中选址。国内公司是否接受报价取决于外国公司的效率。当外国公司的效率不是很高时,效率更高的国内公司将拒绝要约,而合资将在国内公司效率较低的国家进行。当外国公司的效率很高时,效率更高的公司将接受要约,合资企业将在拥有效率更高的国内公司的国家进行。在第四章中,我们仍然考虑两个国家的情况。但是,这次,这两个国家处于细分市场。每个公司的一部分产品出口到另一个国家。运输会产生运输费用。在这种情况下,我们无法明确求解最优利润份额。我们使用隐函数定理来获得一些结果。我们发现,外国公司会选择效率更高的公司,而这种伙伴关系也将符合效率更高的国内公司的利益。

著录项

  • 作者

    Zhong, Litao.;

  • 作者单位

    Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.;

  • 授予单位 Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.;
  • 学科 Economics General.; Economics Commerce-Business.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2006
  • 页码 59 p.
  • 总页数 59
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;贸易经济;
  • 关键词

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