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Models for air-cargo allotment management and booking control.

机译:航空货运分配管理和预订控制的模型。

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摘要

Air carriers sell cargo capacity either as an allotment or on an ad-hoc basis. An allotment is a pre-negotiated amount of capacity on specific flights that is reserved for forwarders through medium-term contracts. In contrast, the carrier makes no prior commitment to accept ad-hoc shipments. This dissertation develops mathematical models to analyze the allotment-contract mechanism design problem and the ad-hoc booking control problem.; We study capacity contracts between carriers and forwarders when certain parameters such as the forwarder's demand, freight charges, and operating costs are its private information. Carriers use contracts to allot bulk capacity to forwarders who deliver consolidated loads throughout the course of a season. Carriers also sell capacity to direct-ship customers. We propose contracts with three parameters: a per-flight allotment, a lump-sum payment for the season, and a per-flight payment that depends on the volume tendered by the forwarder. We identify conditions under which relatively simple payment schemes can eliminate informational rents. We also study how the carrier's profit might be affected when the forwarder may not set its booking limit equal to the allotment. We show that under a linear payment scheme, the forwarder's strategic behavior strictly decreases the carrier's profit. However, the carrier's loss can be made arbitrarily small.; We consider the cargo-booking control problem on a single-leg flight with the goal of maximizing expected contribution. Each piece of cargo is endowed with a random volume and a random weight whose precise values are not known until just before the flight is set to depart. We formulate the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP). Because of its high-dimensional state space, an exact solution is not possible. Therefore, we develop six heuristics. The first four are based on different value-function approximations derived from one-dimensional MDPs. The remaining two heuristics are obtained from solving related mathematical-programming problems. We compare the carrier's profit under the various heuristics with that of the first-come-first-served policy as well as with an upper bound. Numerical experiments show that the value-function approximation derived from separate "volume" and "weight" problems offers the best approach and that the carrier's profit under this heuristic is close to the upper bound.
机译:航空承运人以分配或临时方式出售货物容量。分配是指通过中期合同为货运代理保留的特定航班的预定容量。相反,承运人没有事先承诺接受即席装运。本文建立了数学模型,分析了分配契约机制的设计问题和即席预订控制问题。当货运代理的需求,运费和运营成本等某些参数是其私人信息时,我们研究货运代理与货运代理之间的运力合同。承运商使用合同将大容量分配给在整个季节中运送合并货物的货运代理。承运人还将容量出售给直接运输的客户。我们提出的合同具有三个参数:每次航班分配,该季节的一次性付款以及一次航班付款,这取决于货运代理人的投标量。我们确定了相对简单的付款方案可以消除信息租金的条件。我们还研究了当货运代理未将其预订限额设置为等于拨款额时,会对承运人的利润产生怎样的影响。我们表明,在线性支付方案下,货运代理的战略行为严格降低了承运人的利润。然而,承运人的损失可以任意减小。我们考虑单腿飞行中的货运预定控制问题,目的是使预期贡献最大化。每件货物都具有随机的体积和随机的重量,其精确值直到航班即将起飞前才知道。我们将该问题表述为马尔可夫决策过程(MDP)。由于其高维状态空间,不可能提供精确的解决方案。因此,我们开发了六种启发式方法。前四个是基于从一维MDP推导出的不同的价值函数近似值。剩下的两种启发式方法是通过解决相关的数学编程问题获得的。我们将各种启发式方法下的承运人利润与先到先服务的政策以及上限进行比较。数值实验表明,分别从“体积”和“权重”问题得到的价值函数逼近提供了最佳方法,并且在这种启发式下,承运人的利润接近上限。

著录项

  • 作者

    Amaruchkul, Kannapha.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Minnesota.;

  • 授予单位 University of Minnesota.;
  • 学科 Engineering Industrial.; Transportation.; Operations Research.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2007
  • 页码 143 p.
  • 总页数 143
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 一般工业技术;综合运输;运筹学;
  • 关键词

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