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Research on Asymmetric RD Investment Evolution

机译:研发投资不对称演化研究

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This paper studies asymmetric R&D/product problem. By comparing the results of one synchronize and two sequence games in various stages through an industry's evolution process, which reflect by the ratio of technology spillovers to product substitution, we conclude that endogenous sequence game is the optimal choice and along with the evolution of industry it will switch to synchronize game. This result can explain the scene of asymmetric R&D investment in open developing countries and predicts the law of R&D investment evolution.
机译:本文研究不对称研发/产品问题。通过比较一个行业演化过程中不同阶段的一个同步博弈和两个序列博弈的结果(反映了技术溢出与产品替代的比率),我们得出结论,内生序列博弈是最佳选择,并且伴随着行业的演进。将切换到同步游戏。这一结果可以解释开放发展中国家的研发投资不对称现象,并预测研发投资的演变规律。

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