首页> 外文会议>Summer Computer Simulation Conference(SCSC 2003); 20030720-20030724; Montreal; CA >Simulation in the Mobile Telephony Market: Price Discrimination Strategy under Asymmetrical Conditions
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Simulation in the Mobile Telephony Market: Price Discrimination Strategy under Asymmetrical Conditions

机译:移动电话市场中的仿真:非对称条件下的价格歧视策略

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摘要

In the following paper we propose a competitive model in the mobile telephony market that can be integrated in various simulation environments. The main factors that have been characterizing the mobile telephony industry during the last years are an exponential growth of traffic demand and the evolution from a market monopoly to full competition with the consequent growth of competitive pressure. We aim to formalize the complex competitive environment of network interconnection under a price discrimination hypothesis. The policy of price discrimination in the mobile telephone market is based on the possibility for the carriers to set different retail prices with regard to calls made on-net or off-net. An other important hypothesis is the asymmetry of networks market shares; such asymmetry is due to the incumbent network brand loyalty. Through a simulation program, from our hypotheses we have realised a mobile telephone model development, validation and testing.
机译:在下面的论文中,我们提出了一种可以在各种模拟环境中集成的移动电话市场竞争模型。过去几年中,移动电话行业的主要特征是流量需求呈指数增长,以及从市场垄断到全面竞争的演变,随之而来的竞争压力也在增加。我们的目标是在价格歧视假设下将网络互连的复杂竞争环境正式化。移动电话市场中的价格歧视政策是基于运营商针对网络呼叫或网络呼叫设置不同零售价格的可能性。另一个重要的假设是网络市场份额的不对称。这种不对称性是由于现有的网络品牌忠诚度造成的。通过一个模拟程序,根据我们的假设,我们实现了手机模型的开发,验证和测试。

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