CONTRACT DESIGN OF MORTGAGE LOAN IN ENGINEERING MACHINERY SUPPLY CHAIN

摘要

This paper develops a principal-agent model to analyze the contracts of mortgage guarantee loan under moral hazard framework in the engineering machinery supply chain. It assumes that the financial organization provides the consumers with mortgage guarantee loans on the condition that the manufacturer promises to pay-back the products when the consumers default to pay. The financial flow of the engineering machinery supply chain is determined simultaneously by the manufacturer and the financial organization, in which the manufacturer takes Stackelberg leadership in dictating the risk-undertake proportion. The manufacturer' action delivers the consumers' information which is known to the manufacturer only. So the financial organization can take the manufacturer's action and the interest rate as screen mechanisms to separate the consumers' risk styles. It works out the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium with the method of backward induction. At last, this paper derives implications and gives insights into the results of the equilibriums by comparative static method.