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On a Bounded Budget Network Creation Game

机译:在有限的预算网络创建游戏中

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We consider a network creation game in which, each player (vertex) has a limited budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has a unit cost and each agent tries to minimize its cost which is its local diameter or its total distance to other players in the (undirected) underlying graph of the created network. Two variants of the game are studied: in the MAX version, the cost incurred to a vertex is the maximum distance between that vertex and other vertices, and in the SUM version, the cost incurred to a vertex is the sum of distances between that vertex and other vertices. We prove that in both versions ptire Nash equilibria exist, but the problem of finding the best response of a vertex is NP-hard. Next, we study the maximum possible diameter of an equilibrium graph with n vertices in various cases. For infinite numbers of n, we construct an equilibrium tree with diameter Θ(n) in the MAX version. Also, we prove that the diameter of any equilibrium tree is O(log n) in the SUM version and this bound is tight. When all vertices have unit budgets (i.e. can establish link to just one vertex), the diameter in both versions is O(1). We give an example of equilibrium graph in MAX version, such that all vertices have positive budgets and yet the diameter is as large as Ω((log n)1/2). This interesting result shows that the diameter does not decrease necessarily and may increase as the budgets are increased. For the SUM version, we prove that every equilibrium graph has diameter 2~O((log n)1/2) when all vertices have positive budgets. Moreover, if the budget of every players is at least, k, then every equilibrium graph with diameter more than 3 is k-connected.
机译:我们考虑一个网络创建游戏,其中每个玩家(顶点)的预算有限,无法建立与其他玩家的链接。在我们的模型中,每个链接都有一个单位成本,并且每个代理都试图将其成本最小化,这是它的本地直径或它与所创建网络的(无向)基础图中其他参与者的总距离。研究了游戏的两种变体:在MAX版本中,顶点产生的成本是该顶点与其他顶点之间的最大距离,而在SUM版本中,顶点产生的成本是该顶点之间的距离之和。和其他顶点。我们证明在这两个版本中均存在纳什均衡,但是找到顶点的最佳响应的问题是NP难的。接下来,我们研究在各种情况下具有n个顶点的平衡图的最大可能直径。对于n的无限个数,我们在MAX版本中构造一个直径为Θ(n)的平衡树。同样,我们证明了任何均衡树的直径在SUM版本中均为O(log n),并且该边界是紧密的。当所有顶点都具有单位预算(即可以建立到一个顶点的链接)时,两种版本的直径均为O(1)。我们以MAX版本中的平衡图为例,所有顶点的预算都为正,而直径却高达Ω((log n)1/2)。这个有趣的结果表明,直径并不一定会减小,而是会随着预算的增加而增加。对于SUM版本,我们证明当所有顶点都具有正预算时,每个平衡图的直径都为2〜O((log n)1/2)。此外,如果每个参与者的预算至少为k,则每个直径大于3的均衡图都被k连接。

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