NUCLEAR POLLUTION EXPOSURE AND RISK ASSESSMENT - THE CASE OF NUCLEAR REACTORS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE EMISSION

摘要

Preventive policies for areas potentially exposed to radioactive contamination require management decisions which weigh the benefits of prevention against the risks and disruptions associated with their implementation. A framework is needed that integrates risk assessment and engineering options, compares options for risk reduction, communicates uncertainty, and effectively allows reiteration of the decision-making process. In the first part of the chapter, a brief description of 1986 Chernobyl accident and its Romania's related experience is done. A by-product of the environmental contamination was the contamination of foodstuffs produced in the affected areas. After Chernobyl accident, scientists who are not experts in radiation effects have attributed various biological and health effects to radiation exposure. These changes cannot be attributed to radiation exposure, especially when the normal incidence is unknown, and is much more likely to be due to psychological factors and stress. Attributing these effects to radiation not only increases the psychological pressure in the population and provokes additional stress-related health problems; it also undermines confidence in the competence of the radiation specialists. These observations are similar not only for the Former Soviet Union (FSU) regions, but also for Romania. In the second part, the case of a Bulgaria-Romania reactor is presented. It is widely recognized that environmental stress, especially environmental degradation could contribute, under certain political, economical, and social conditions, to the appearance of serious conflicts mainly in the developing countries. Romania and Bulgaria are a potential example in this regard, in relation to their existing Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). Response strategies to this potential threatening environmental change must be discussed. Four basic approaches that can be taken to enhance human security in both countries are considered. The first is fundamentally a preventive strategy oriented toward minimizing, if not entirely averting the potential nuclear environmental changes threaten human security. The other three approaches presume that a (serious) incident will materialize, and thus are designed to reduce the vulnerability of human communities to it by avoiding the impacts of the changes, by creating defenses against the impacts or by simply adapting to the changes. All these options must be considered in relation to 1986 Chernobyl accident experience.