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The Emperor's New Password Creation Policies: An Evaluation of Leading Web Services and the Effect of Role in Resisting Against Online Guessing

机译:皇帝的新密码创作策略:对领先的Web服务的评估以及在抵制在线猜测中的作用

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摘要

While much has changed in Internet security over the past decades, textual passwords remain as the dominant method to secure user web accounts and they are proliferating in nearly every new web services. Nearly every web services, no matter new or aged, now enforce some form of password creation policy. In this work, we conduct an extensive empirical study of 50 password creation policies that are currently imposed on high-profile web services, including 20 policies mainly from US and 30 ones from mainland China. We observe that no two sites enforce the same password creation policy, there is little rationale under their choices of policies when changing policies, and Chinese sites generally enforce more lenient policies than their English counterparts. We proceed to investigate the effectiveness of these 50 policies in resisting against the primary threat to password accounts (i.e. online guessing) by testing each policy against two types of weak passwords which represent two types of online guessing. Our results show that among the total 800 test instances, 541 ones are accepted: 218 ones come from trawling online guessing attempts and 323 ones come from targeted online guessing attempts. This implies that, currently, the policies enforced in leading sites largely fail to serve their purposes, especially vulnerable to targeted online guessing attacks.
机译:虽然在过去的几十年中,在互联网安全性中发生了很多变化,但文本密码仍然是保护用户Web帐户的主导方法,并且它们在几乎每个新的Web服务中都是增强的。几乎每一个Web服务,无论是新的还是年龄,现在都强制执行某种形式的密码创建策略。在这项工作中,我们对目前对高调的Web服务产生的50个密码创作策略进行了广泛的实证研究,其中包括来自中国大陆和30名的20个政策。我们观察到没有两个网站执行相同的密码创作策略,在改变政策时的政策选择下几乎没有理由,而中国网站通常强制执行比英语同行更加宽松的政策。我们继续调查这50个政策在抵制对密码账户的主要威胁(即在线猜测)的有效性,通过针对代表两种类型的在线猜测的两种类型的弱密码来测试每个策略。我们的结果表明,在800个测试实例中,541人被接受:218人来自拖网在线猜测尝试,323个来自目标在线猜测尝试。这意味着,目前,在领先地点强制执行的政策在很大程度上无法满足其目的,特别是易受针对在线猜测攻击的攻击。

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