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An Automated Configurable Trojan Insertion Framework for Dynamic Trust Benchmarks

机译:一种用于动态信任基准测试的自动配置可配置的特洛伊木马插入框架

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Malicious hardware modification, also known as hardware Trojan attack, has emerged as a serious security concern for electronic systems. Such attacks compromise the basic premise of hardware root of trust. Over the past decade, significant research efforts have been directed to carefully analyze the trust issues arising from hardware Trojans and to protect against them. This vast body of work often needs to rely on well-defined set of trust benchmarks that can reliably evaluate the effectiveness of the protection methods. In recent past, efforts have been made to develop a benchmark suite to analyze the effectiveness of pre-silicon Trojan detection and prevention methodologies. However, there are only a limited number of Trojan inserted benchmarks available. Moreover, there is an inherent bias as the researcher is aware of Trojan properties such as location and trigger condition since the current benchmarks are static. In order to create an unbiased and robust benchmark suite to evaluate the effectiveness of any protection technique, we have developed a comprehensive framework of automatic hardware Trojan insertion. Given a netlist, the framework will automatically generate a design with single or multiple Trojan instances based user-specified Trojan properties. It allows a wide variety of configurations, such as the type of Trojan, Trojan activation probability, number of triggers, and choice of payload. The tool ensures that the inserted Trojan is a valid one and allow for provisions to optimize the Trojan footprint (area and switching). Experiments demonstrate that a state-of-the-art Trojan detection technique provides poor efficacy when using benchmarks generated by our tool. This tool is available for download from http://www.trust-hub.org/.
机译:恶意硬件修改,也称为硬件特洛伊木攻击,已成为电子系统的严重安全问题。这种攻击损害了信任的硬件根的基本前提。在过去的十年中,已经致力于仔细分析五金木马产生的信任问题并防止对抗这些努力。这一庞大的工作往往需要依靠明确定义的信任基准组,可以可靠地评估保护方法的有效性。最近,已经努力开发基准套件,分析硅粒酸前检测和预防方法的有效性。但是,只有有限数量的特洛伊木马插入基准。此外,由于当前基准是静态的,因此研究人员意识到特洛伊木马属性如位置和触发条件的固有偏见。为了创建一个不偏不倚和强大的基准套件来评估任何保护技术的有效性,我们开发了全面的自动硬件特洛伊木马插入框架。给定网表,该框架将自动生成一个基于单个或多个基于特洛伊木马实例的用户指定的特洛伊木马属性的设计。它允许各种各样的配置,例如特洛伊木马,特洛伊木马激活概率,触发次数和有效载荷的选择。该工具确保插入的特洛伊木马是一个有效的特洛伊木马,允许提供优化特洛伊木马足迹(区域和切换)的规定。实验表明,当使用由我们工具产生的基准时,最先进的特洛伊木马检测技术提供了差的功效。此工具可用于从http://www.trust-hub.org/下载。

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