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MINIMIZING GLOVEBOX GLOVE BREACHES: PART II

机译:最小化手套盒手套违规行为:第二部分

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As a matter of good business practices, a team of glovebox experts from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been assembled to proactively investigate processes and procedures that minimize unplanned breaches in the glovebox, e.g., glove failures. A major part of this effort involves the review of glovebox glove failures that have occurred at the Plutonium Facility and at the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Facility. Information dating back to 1993 has been compiled from formal records. This data has been combined with information obtained from a baseline inventory of about 9,000 glovebox gloves. The key attributes tracked include those related to location, the glovebox glove, type and location of breaches, the worker, and the consequences resulting from breaches. This glovebox glove failure analysis yielded results in the areas of the ease of collecting this type of data, the causes of most glove failures that have occurred, the effectiveness of current controls, and recommendations to improve hazard control systems. As expected, a significant number of breaches involve high-risk operations such as grinding, hammering, using sharps (especially screwdrivers), and assembling equipment. Surprisingly, tasks such as the movement of equipment and material between gloveboxes and the opening of cans are also major contributions of breaches. Almost half the gloves fail within a year of their install date. The greatest consequence for over 90% of glovebox glove failures is alpha contamination of protective clothing. Personnel self-monitoring at the gloveboxes continues to be the most effective way of detecting glovebox glove failures. Glove failures from these tasks can be reduced through changes in procedures and the design of remote-handling apparatus. The Nuclear Materials Technology Division management uses this information to improve hazard control systems to reduce the number of unplanned breaches in the glovebox further. As a result, excursions of contaminants into the operator’s breathing zone and excess exposure to the radiological sources associated with unplanned breaches in the glovebox have been minimized. In conclusion, investigations of control failures, near misses, and accidents contribute to an organization's scientific and technological excellence by providing information that can be used to increase its operational safety.
机译:作为良好的商业实践问题,来自LOS Alamos国家实验室(LANL)的手套箱专家团队已经组建,以主动调查手套箱中的计划和程序,例如手套失败。这项努力的主要部分涉及审查在钚设施和化学和冶金研究设施的普罗维尔盒手套失败。返回1993年的信息已从正式记录中编制。该数据已结合从大约9,000个手套手套的基线库存中获得的信息。跟踪的关键属性包括与地点,手套箱手套,违规行为,工人的类型和位置有关的属性,以及违背造成的后果。该手套箱手套故障分析产生了易于收集这种数据的易于收集的领域,最大的手套故障发生,目前控制的有效性以及改善危险控制系统的建议。正如预期的那样,大量违规涉及高风险的操作,如磨削,锤击,使用锐利(尤其是螺丝刀)和组装设备。令人惊讶的是,手套箱和罐头的开放之间的设备和材料的运动等任务也是违规的主要贡献。在安装日期的一年内,几乎一半的手套失败了。超过90%的手套手套失败的最大后果是alpha污染防护服。手套箱的人员自我监控仍然是检测手套箱手套故障的最有效方式。通过遥控装置的程序和设计的变化,可以减少来自这些任务的手套故障。核材料技术部门管理这些信息使用这些信息来改善危险控制系统,以进一步减少手套箱中的计划内泄露的数量。结果,最小化了污染物进入操作员呼吸区和过度暴露于手套箱中的无限漏洞相关的放射源的偏移。总之,通过提供可用于提高其运营安全的信息,对未命中的控制失败的调查有助于组织的科学和技术卓越。

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