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Defining Judicial Accountability Post Political Transition in Indonesia

机译:在印度尼西亚界定司法问责制

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Constitutional Reform after the fall of Soeharto's New Order brings favorable direction for the judiciary. Constitutional guarantee of judicial independence as regulated in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, closing dark memories in the past. Besides, in Art 24 (2) of the 1945 Constitution decide the Judiciary is held by the Supreme Court and the judicial bodies below and a Constitutional Court. Such a strict direction of regulation plus the transformation of the political system in a democratic direction should bring about the implementation of the independent and autonomous judiciary. But in reality, even though in a democratic political system and constitutional arrangement affirms the guarantee of independence, but it doesn't represent the actual situation. There some problem which remains, such as (i) the absence of a permanent format regarding the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and Judicial Commission, and (ii) still many efforts to weaken judiciary through many ways such criminalization of judge. Referring to the problem above, then there are gaps between what "is" and what "ought", among others, First, by changes political configuration that tend to be more democratic, the judiciary should be more autonomous. But in reality, various problems arise such as (i) disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations between judicial power actors, (ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over their decisions, (iii) judicial corruption. Second, by the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, there will be no legislation that reduced constitutional guarantee. But in reality, many legislation or regulations that still not in line with a constitutional guarantee concerning judicial independence. This paper reviews and describes in-depth about how to implement constitutional guarantees of judicial independence after the political transition and conceptualize its order to strengthening rule of law in Indonesia.
机译:Soeharto的新订单下降后的宪法改革为司法机构带来了有利的方向。 1945年宪法第24(1)款规定的司法独立宪法保障,过去闭上了黑暗记忆。此外,1945年宪法的第24(2)章)决定司法机构由最高法院和下面的司法机构和宪法法院持有。这种严格的监管方向加上了民主方向政治体系的转变,应该带来独立和自治司法机构的实施。但实际上,尽管在民主政治制度和宪法安排中,但肯定了独立的保障,但它并不代表实际情况。有一些问题,如(i)缺乏关于最高法院,宪法法院和司法委员会之间的制度关系的永久形式,并仍然通过许多刑事犯罪来削弱司法机构的许多努力法官。参考上面的问题,那么“是”和“应该”的问题之间存在差距,其中,首先,通过改变政治配置,往往更为民主,司法机构应该更加自主。但实际上,出现了各种问题,如(i)在司法权力行动者之间的关系模式下,(i)(ii)各种试图将法官犯罪,(iii)司法腐败,如此其次,通过司法机构独立的宪法保障,没有立法减少宪法保障。但实际上,许多立法或法规仍然没有符合关于司法独立的宪法保障。本文对如何在政治转型后实施司法独立的宪法保障,并概念化其向加强印度尼西亚法治的宪法提供评估和描述。

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