Finding Reciprocities Between the Intellectual Frames of Resilience Engineering and High Reliability Organizations

摘要

With the growth in new technologies, disparate sociotechnical systems, ranging from aviation to infrastructure, are rapidly getting interconnected. The scope, level and complexity of these novel sociotechnical systems present a renewed challenge for safety as a discipline. In this regard, in recent times, two major research traditions have emerged for addressing safety--high reliability organizations (HRO) and resilience engineering (RE). Both have emerged from different research traditions, have different origins and are sustained by different practices. While both HRO and RE have similarities and differences, they simply cannot be juxtaposed together due to their epistemic cultures. To this extent, researchers have emphasized the diversity and at the same time recognized the need for building bridges across these two research traditions. A particular insight provided by researchers has been to demonstrate that the intellectual frames shape epistemic discourses and concepts within these two traditions. Intellectual frames are a shared epistemological basis on which practitioners and researchers, dispense, negotiate and shape research traditions, as well as their own identities. Based on this insight, a particular manner in which HRO and RE can be partially comprehended together is in terms of the finding reciprocities between these frames and reconsidering them according to the requirements of the field of safety science. While the intellectual frames are a product of historical development, their joint comprehension would require a reflexive engagement with the key aspects that constitute these traditions. Toward this end, the article presents three epistemic linkages that provide possible reciprocities between the two intellectual frames of CE and HRO in sociotechnical systems. These three linkages include comprehending the social dimension of high-risk systems; perspectival nature of the lived experience of people in high-risk systems; and the designed dimension and engineering knowledge involved in sociotechnical systems. Building and assessing these pathways will allow for an all-rounded discussion of safety science for sociotechnical systems.