Research on the Influencing Factors of Executive Compensation in China's Listed Banks— Based on Empirical Evidence of China's Listed Banks from 2013 To 2017

摘要

Based on principal-agent theory, managerialism theory and managerial power theory, relevant data of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed Banks from 2013 to 2017 are used to examine the influencing factors of bank executive compensation from the perspectives of bank scale, bank performance, bank governance and bank risk. The empirical study has found that there is a significant positive correlation between bank performance and executive compensation, and bank scale and independent director system fail to have a significant impact on executive compensation. Board diligence has a significant positive correlation with bank executive compensation, supporting the theory of managerial power. Bank risk is negatively correlated with executive compensation. The research conclusion shows that the banking industry should pay attention to the control of operating risk, improve the internal governance of the bank, and ensure the rationality of the compensation system.