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The Port-in-Use Covert Channel Attack

机译:使用封端隐秘频道攻击

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摘要

We propose a port-is-in-use attack, which is intended for leaking sensitive information in multilevel secure operating systems. Our approach is based on TCP socket mechanism widely used in Linux for interprocess communication. Despite the strong limitations inherent in operating systems with mandatory access control, sockets may not be restricted by the security policy, which makes it possible theoretically to transfer information from one process to another from a high security level to a low one. The proposed attack belongs to the operating system storage transition-based class attack. The main idea is to use the availability of TCP port, which is shared among processes at more than one security level, as the communication medium. The possibility or impossibility of binding a socket to a predefined port is used to transmit a bit of 0 or 1 respectively. We implement proof-of-concept exploit, which was used to check the idea and to evaluate covert channel capacity. Experimental results show that the proposed technique provides high rate covert channel, that means a significant threat of confidentiality in multilevel secure operating systems.
机译:我们提出了一种港口使用攻击,旨在用于在多级安全操作系统中泄漏敏感信息。我们的方法基于Linux广泛用于切换通信的TCP套接字机制。尽管具有强制性访问控制的操作系统固有的强烈限制,但是安全策略可能不限于套接字,这使得理论上使得可以将信息从一个过程传送到另一个过程到低于低安全级别。所提出的攻击属于基于操作系统存储转换的类攻击。主要思想是使用TCP端口的可用性,该端口在多于一个安全级别的过程中共享,作为通信媒体。将套接字绑定到预定义端口的可能性或不可能性分别用于发送0或1的比特。我们实施概念验证漏洞利用,用于检查该想法并评估隐蔽信道容量。实验结果表明,该技术提供了高速率隐蔽通道,这意味着多级安全操作系统中的机密性威胁。

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