Empirical Analysis on Dishonesty Behaviors of Main Bodies In Construction Ineffective Bidding

摘要

In the process of engineering construction, due to various subjective or objective reasons, the bidding activities can not play the effectiveness of optimal deal and allocation of resources, so as to make the bidding become the format, is called the ineffective tendering in this paper. For the most prominent dishonesty behaviors of main bodies in construction ineffective bidding, this paper makes the empirical analysis through the real cases and analyzes the dishonesty behaviors and motivations of the main subjects including the tenderee, bidders, supervising levels and evaluation parties. For the most serious and prominent problem of bidding rigging, establish the game theory model. Finally, this article concludes that establishing the credit evaluation mechanism, strengthening the information disclosure, introducing bidding supervision and report incentive mechanism can help to reduce the dishonesty behaviors. From long term view, it also help to weaken the preference of bidding dishonesty and change the social atmosphere so that bidding system can play better for the role of effective allocation of social resources.