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Study of Manufacturers and Retailers Pricing under Dual Channel Mode-Based on Stackelberg Gamble

机译:基于Stackelberg赌博的双通道模式制造商和零售商定价研究

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Manufacturers dual channel mode is accompanied by the birth of the Internet and the emergence of new sales environment, the retailers adhered to the traditional channels under this mode are often required to lower prices in order to cope with shocks. This article assumes market that only has one manufacturer and one retailer, establish consumer utility function including consumer loyalty factor. Firstly, deduce the traditional channels of only a single retailer balanced pricing, use Stackelberg gamble to deduce balanced pricing of manufacturers and retailers under dual channel mode. By comparing the two modes retailer balanced pricing, this paper finds retailers can take advantage of consumer loyalty of the brand to effectively resist the impact of the network channels instead of blindly cutting prices.
机译:制造商双通道模式伴随着互联网的诞生和新的销售环境的出现,零售商遵守这种模式下的传统渠道通常需要降低价格,以应对冲击。本文假设仅拥有一个制造商和一家零售商的市场,建立了消费者的实用功能,包括消费者忠诚度因素。首先,推断只有单一零售商平衡定价的传统渠道,使用Stackelberg赌博在双通道模式下推导出制造商和零售商的均衡定价。通过比较两种模式零售商平衡定价,本文发现零售商可以利用品牌的消费者忠诚度,有效地抵制网络渠道的影响而不是盲目的降低价格。

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