Research on the Informal Institutional Changes' Impact on the Governance of the Small-scale Rural Public Resource-Taking the Well Governance of L Village as an Example

摘要

The lack of property rights of China's rural small-scale public resources results in excessive use, and even exhaustion of public resources. Based on this, the paper takes Ostrom's game model of public resources for reference and uses evolutionary game theory tools to analyze the influential factors of public resources in the rural informal institutional change, and then makes the research on the impact of the informal system changes on the governance of public resources. It reveals that: without the impact of external factors, the cooperative behavior that utilizes resources under the guidance of the informal institutions is stable and sustainable. While the impact of external factors such as water resource price, resources accessible technology and social cohesion existed, the informal institutions that constraint people's behavior may be broken, resulting in overall reduction of the stock of long-term resources, or even exhaustion. So the paper holds that: it is of great necessity to focus on the role of the informal system in the governance of rural small-scale public resources, but the guidance of the government should be considered when the conditions are not mature.