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Innovation, capital and market capture

机译:创新,资本和市场捕获

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From the beginning of management of technology, technological innovation has always been thought of as consisting of two concepts — invention and commercialization. And this definition of technological innovation does capture the short-term history of innovation and industrial competition but not the long term history. In the early history of any new radical technology and new industry built upon it as a core technology, the two ideas capture that early part — but not the later part in what Schumpeter had called ‘creative destruction’. For example, if invention and commercialization were sufficient to capture the long-term history of the semiconductor IC chip industry, then America would still be the dominant producers of memory chips; but it is not. American firms invented and commercialized DRAMS in the 1970s; and yet they were not significant producers of these after 1981. DRAM industrial dominance passed to Japanese firms. But by 2000, market dominance was captured by Korean firms, eliminating Japanese competition, although earlier Japanese firms had eliminated American competition. How did all that happen? It is well known that, as anticipated by ‘Moores’ Law', DRAM products went through many next-generation-technology products (from 16K chips in the 1970s to 16G chips in the 2010s). At certain of these technology discontinuities, there occurred major changes in industrial dominance. How did these dominant industrial shifts occur, over the long-term of technological innovation? To explain this, we add a third basic idea to the definition of ‘technological innovation’ - which is the idea of ‘market capture’. In this way, one can think not only about ‘short-term’ technological innovation (as invention + commercialization) but also about ‘long-term’ technological innovation (as invention + commercialization + market-capture). For market-capture, the ro- e of a capital structure, in addition to technology, has turned out to be a critical factor. To understand in long-term of technological innovation how precisely does capital interact with a technology-discontinuity, we review the cases of Japanese and Korean captures of the memory chip market.
机译:从技术管理开始,技术创新一直被认为是由两个概念和商业化组成。这种技术创新的定义确实捕捉了创新和工业竞争的短期历史,而不是长期历史。在任何新的自由派技术和新行业的早期历史上建立在它作为核心技术之上,这两个想法捕获了早期部分 - 但不是后来的谢普彼得称为“创造性的破坏”。例如,如果发明和商业化足以捕获半导体IC芯片行业的长期历史,那么美国仍将成为内存芯片的主要生产商;但这不是。美国公司在20世纪70年代发明了和商业化的DRAM;然而,在1981年之后,他们并不重要的生产者。DRAM工业优势通过日本公司。但到2000年,韩国公司捕获了市场统治,消除了日本竞争,尽管日本公司删除了美国竞争。这一切如何发生?众所周知,正如“摩尔人法”所预期的那样,DRAM产品经历了许多下一代技术产品(从20世纪70年代的16K筹码到2010年的16G筹码)。在某些技术不连续性中,发生了产业统治的重大变化。在长期的技术创新中,这些主导的产业转变是如何发生的?为了解释这一点,我们为“技术创新”的定义增加了第三个基本思想 - 这是“市场捕获”的想法。通过这种方式,不仅可以思考“短期”技术创新(作为发明+商业化),而且还可以思考“长期”技术创新(作为发明+商业化+市场捕获)。对于市场捕获,除了技术之外,资本结构的RO-E还结果是一个关键因素。要在长期的技术创新中理解,资本如何与技术不连续进行资本互动,我们审查了日本和韩国捕获的内存芯片市场的案件。

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