Analysis of Stable Prices in Non-Decreasing Sponsored Search Auction

摘要

Most critical challenge of applying generalized second price (GSP) idea in multi-round sponsored search auction (SSA) is to prevent revenue loss for search engine provider (SEP). In this paper, we propose non-decreasing Sponsored Search Auction (NDSSA) to guarantee SEP's revenue. Each advertiser's bid increment is restricted by minimum increase price (MIP) in NDSSA. The MIP determination strategy influences bid convergence speed and SEP's revenue. Fixed MIP strategy and Additive-Increase/Multiplicative-Decrease (AIMD) principle are applied to determine MIP values, and they are evaluated in this paper. For the convergence speed analysis, fixed MIP strategy converges faster than AIME in most instances. For SEP's revenue, AIMD assists SEP to gain more revenue than fixed MIP strategy by experiments. Simultaneously, SEP's revenue in Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction (VCG) is the lower bound of that in AIMD.