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Exploring the Resilience of Some Lightweight Ciphers Against Profiled Single Trace Attacks

机译:探索一些轻量级密码的恢复力,反对分布的单痕攻击

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This paper compares attack outcomes w.r.t. profiled single trace attacks of four different lightweight ciphers in order to investigate which of their properties, if any, contribute to attack success. We show that mainly the diffusion properties of both the round function and the key schedule play a role. In particular, the more (reasonably statistically independent) intermediate values are produced in a target implementation, the better attacks succeed. A crucial aspect for lightweight ciphers is hence the key schedule which is often designed to be particularly light. This design choice implies that information from all round keys can be easily combined which results in attacks that succeed with ease.
机译:本文比较了攻击结果w.r.t.四种不同轻量级密码的单次微量攻击,以调查其哪些属性(如果有的话)有助于攻击成功。我们表明,主要是圆形功能的扩散特性和关键时间表发挥作用。特别地,在目标实现中产生越多(合理的统计学)的中间值,越好的攻击成功。因此,轻量级密码的关键方面是通常设计为特别轻微的关键时间表。这种设计选择意味着可以很容易地组合来自所有圆形键的信息,这导致攻击易于成功。

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