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Exploring the Resilience of Some Lightweight Ciphers Against Profiled Single Trace Attacks

机译:探索某些轻量级密码对异形单迹攻击的恢复能力

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This paper compares attack outcomes w.r.t. profiled single trace attacks of four different lightweight ciphers in order to investigate which of their properties, if any, contribute to attack success. We show that mainly the diffusion properties of both the round function and the key schedule play a role. In particular, the more (reasonably statistically independent) intermediate values are produced in a target implementation, the better attacks succeed. A crucial aspect for lightweight ciphers is hence the key schedule which is often designed to be particularly light. This design choice implies that information from all round keys can be easily combined which results in attacks that succeed with ease.
机译:本文比较了攻击结果剖析了四种不同轻量级密码的单迹攻击,以便研究它们的哪些属性(如果有的话)有助于攻击成功。我们证明,主要是回合函数和关键进度表的扩散特性都起作用。特别是,在目标实现中产生的中间值越多(在统计上合理地独立),攻击成功的可能性就越大。因此,轻量级密码的一个关键方面是密钥时间表,该密钥时间表通常设计得特别轻。这种设计选择意味着可以轻松组合所有回合密钥中的信息,从而使攻击轻松获得成功。

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