首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Sustainable Energy and Intelligent Systems >IMPACT OF DECREASING NUMBER OF BIDDERS ON POWER BIDDING IN DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT
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IMPACT OF DECREASING NUMBER OF BIDDERS ON POWER BIDDING IN DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT

机译:减少投标人数量对解除管制环境招标的影响

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Optimum power bidding in deregulation is quite important not only for business profitability but also from energy sustainability. Particularly this becomes interesting when any one bidder is withdrawing participation amongst several contesting bidders. In this work effect of withdrawal of one bidder among three participating bidders are analyzed. Here each bidder has one thermal generating unit & they are offering different bidding prices for gaining maximum profit. Different category of bidding situations are considered when three bidders are withdrawing power bidding one by one. Different bidding profile combinations along with some technical constraints like power balance constraints, power generation limit & fuel cost constraints are considered here. Economic power scheduling has been done using Newton-Raphson method for standard IEEE 9 bus test system. Impact of decreasing number of bidder on rest of the participating bidder's profits, market price have been analysed in each case. For the power bidding problem, theory of dominance approach of Game theory has been applied & searching of the Nash equilibrium has been accomplished. It is observed that the participating bidders are gaining more profit except in "sub-marginal bidding" when one particular bidder has made it's exit. But power selling price has increased in all cases.
机译:放松管制中的最佳电力竞标不仅适用于业务盈利,而且来自能源可持续性。特别是当任何一个投标人都在撤回几个比赛投标人之间时变得有趣。在这项工作中,分析了三名参与投标人中撤回一个投标人的效果。在这里,每个投标人都有一个热发电单元,他们提供了利润最大利润的不同招标价格。当三名投标人逐一撤回电力竞标时,考虑不同类别的竞标情况。不同的竞标轮廓组合以及一些技术限制,如电力平衡约束,这里考虑发电限制和燃料成本约束。经济功率调度已经使用Newton-Raphson方法进行了标准IEEE 9总线测试系统。在参与投标人的剩余利润下,减少投标人数的影响,在每种情况下都分析了市场价格。对于权力招标问题,博弈论的主导方法理论已经应用和搜索纳什均衡已经完成。据观察,除了一个特定投标人已经退出时,参与投标人在“子边缘招标”之外的利润更多。但销售价格在所有情况下都有所增加。

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