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Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Modeling and Stability Analysis of Subsidy Policy on Safety Investment in SMEs

机译:中小企业安全投资补贴政策的进化基于博弈论的建模与稳定性分析

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Evolutionary game theory originated as an application of the mathematical theory of games to biological contexts, having the advantages of truly reflecting the diversity and complexity to provide theoretical basis to study macro-control group behavior. The evolutionary game theory-based modeling and stability analysis of subsidy policy on safety investment in SMEs is studied, and the simulation about the effect of the alteration of the ratio on the evolvement results is executed. The results indicate that the safety subsidy of local governments can enhance SMEs' enthusiasm to invest. It has excellent significance to study further how to achieve equilibrium between SMEs and local governments using evolutionary game theory, and to provide theoretical basis to study operation mode of subsidy policy on safety investment in SMEs.
机译:进化博弈论起源于游戏的数学理论的应用,真正反映了多样性和复杂性,为研究宏观对照组行为提供理论​​依据。研究了中小企业安全投资补贴政策的进化基于博弈的建模和稳定性分析,并执行了对演变结果的比例改变效果的模拟。结果表明,地方政府的安全补贴可以提升中小企业的投资热情。进一步研究了如何在利用进化博弈理论实现中小企业和地方政府之间的均衡具有卓越的意义,并为研究中小企业安全投资的补贴政策研究运作模式提供理论依据。

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