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Contract Theory and Incentive of Civil Servants

机译:公务员的合同理论和激励

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摘要

There are many forms of incentive methods for civil servants, but the faulty incentive mechanism will lead incentive methods to achieve unsatisfactory result. The reason for the arising of this situation can be explained from the point of view of contract theory. This paper uses the core ideology of contract theory to study the problem of incentive to the civil servants. It revealed that too much agency level in the process of contract execution, hard to distinguish ability type, unable to observe effort extent, less of evaluate techniques for achievement of civil servants, and moral hazard in multiple tasks and team task are those which cause inefficiency. To reduce the effects of these facts as much as possible, the incentive mechanism of civil Servants could adjust according to the thoughts of contract the-ory.(Abstract)
机译:公务员有许多形式的激励方法,但错误的激励机制将导致激励方法来实现不满意的结果。从合同理论的角度来说,可以解释这种情况的原因。本文采用合同理论的核心思想研究了对公务员激励问题的问题。它透露,合同执行过程中的代理水平太多,难以区分能力类型,无法观察到努力程度,少评价为实现公务员的技术,以及多项任务和团队任务的道德危害是导致效率低下的人。要尽可能减少这些事实的影响,公务员的激励机制可以根据合同思想进行调整。(摘要)

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