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An Explanation of Evolutionary Game Theory for the Circulative Flowed Phenomenon in Chinese Rural Labor Transfer

机译:中国农村劳动力转移循环流动现象进化博弈论的解释

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The famous Todaro model could not explain the circulative flowed phenomenon in the course of rural labor transfer. The paper uses Sethi's generic replicator dynamic model (1998) of evolutionary game theory to explain the circulative flowed phenomenon based Chinese statistical data. It builds the urban-rural ternary-structure model including rural section, urban informal section and urban formal section, which breaks the rural-urban dual-structure limitation of Todaro model. Then it draws the necessary conditions of the asymptotic stable equilibrium (Evolutionary Equilibrium) and stable focus in the evolutionary function of Chinese rural labor transfer, which the phase diagram of stable focus describes the circulative flowed phenomenon of rural-urban population proportion. At last, it analyses some factors influenced the convergent course, including learning barriers in the urban formal sector and informal sector and rural-urban income gap.
机译:着名的Todaro Model无法解释农村劳动转移过程中的流动流动现象。本文采用Sethi的通用复制器动态模型(1998)的进化博弈论,解释了基于循环流动现象的中国统计数据。它建立了城乡三元结构模型,包括农村截面,城市非正式科和城市正式截面,破坏了塔达罗模型的农村城市双结构限制。然后它借鉴了渐近稳定平衡(进化均衡)的必要条件,并稳定地关注中国农村劳动力转移的进化功能,稳定焦点的相提表描述了农村城市人口比例的循环流动现象。最后,它分析了一些影响因素,包括城市正规部门和非正规部门和农村城市收入差距的学习障碍。

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