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Assessing Attack Threat by the Probability of Following Attacks

机译:通过以下攻击的可能性评估攻击威胁

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In this paper a novel approach to assessing the threat of network intrusions is proposed. Unlike the present approaches which assess the attack threat either from a backward perspective (how probable a security state can be reached) or from the perspective of the attacks themselves (how much an attack would cause damage to the network), this approach assesses the attack threat from a forwarding perspective (how probable it would be the precursor of future attacks). First, to every attack type and some attack scenarios, their Probabilities of having Following Attacks (PFAs) are calculated by a data mining algorithm. Then the threats of real time intrusions are assessed by these probabilities. The result of the threat assessment can help identify the intrusion alerts which would be the best evidence for the coming attacks from tremendous amount of intrusion alerts, thus this approach can be used for intrusion prediction. The approach is validated by DARPA 2000 and DARPA 1999 intrusion detection evaluation datasets.
机译:本文提出了一种评估网络侵犯威胁的新方法。与本方法不同,这些方法是从后向观点(如何达到安全状态)或从攻击本身的角度来看(攻击会导致网络造成损坏的程度),这种方法评估了攻击从转发角度威胁(如何可能是未来攻击的前兆)。首先,对于每种攻击类型和某些攻击方案,它们的具有攻击之后的概率(PFAS)由数据挖掘算法计算。然后通过这些概率评估实时入侵的威胁。威胁评估的结果有助于确定入侵警报,这是从巨大的入侵警报中攻击的最佳证据,因此这种方法可用于入侵预测。该方法由DARPA 2000和DARPA 1999入侵检测评估数据集验证。

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