Peircean Pragmatic Truth and da Costa’s Quasi-Truth

摘要

In this paper we present a conception of the Peircean pragmatic truth and a formal definition of pragmatic truth, the quasi-truth – this concept, previously introduced by da Costa and collaborators, on trying to capture the meaning of the theories of pragmatist thinkers such as Peirce and James, is considered as the truth conception inherent to empirical theories and a generalization (for partial contexts) of Tarski’s correspondence characterization of truth. By defining the mathematical concept of partial structure and by using a special semantical approach, we analyze a suitable logic that can be used as the underlying logic for theories whose truth conception is the quasi-truth. We delineate a Kripke model semantics for this logic and among some fundamental results we show that it is a kind of Ja′skowski discussive logic, a paraconsistent modal logic.