首页> 外文会议>International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics >Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment
【24h】

Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment

机译:关键词拍卖中的外部性:一个实证和理论评估

获取原文

摘要

The value of acquiring a slot in a sponsored search list (that comes along with the organic links in a search engine's result page) might depend on who else is shown in the other sponsored positions. To empirically evaluate this claim, we develop a model of ordered search applied to keyword advertising, in which users browse slots from the top to the bottom of the sponsored list and make their clicking decisions slot by slot. Our contribution is twofold: first, we use impression and click data from Microsoft Live to estimate the ordered search model. With these estimates in hand, we are able to assess how the click-through rate of an ad is affected by the user's click history and by the other competing links. Our dataset suggests that externality effects are indeed economically and statistically significant. Second, we study Nash equilibria of the Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) and characterize the scoring rule that produces greatest profits in a complete information setting.
机译:在赞助的搜索列表中获取插槽的值(以及搜索引擎的结果页面中的有机链路)可能取决于其他谁在其他赞助位置中显示。为了经验评估这一主张,我们开发了应用于关键字广告的有序搜索的模型,其中用户从赞助列表的底部浏览插槽,并通过插槽进行单击切片。我们的贡献是双重的:首先,我们使用印象并点击Microsoft Live的数据来估计有序搜索模型。通过这些估计,我们能够评估广告的点击率如何受到用户单击历史的影响以及其他竞争链路的影响。我们的数据集表明,外部性效果确实在经济上和统计上显着。其次,我们研究纳什均衡的广义二价拍卖(GSP),并表征了在完整信息设置中产生最大利润的评分规则。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号