Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information: Information Sharing and Contracting in a Just-in-Time Environment

摘要

1 Introduction Supply chain interactions are frequently analyzed in idealized and normative model settings, in which the system behavior is described for fully rational and profit maximizing decision makers. Optimal decisions and strategies in these normative frameworks are typically derived by applying Operations Research methods in order to make predictions regarding the supply chain performance even for complex settings involving, e.g., uncertainties or information asymmetries. However, recent work in experimental economics and behavioral operations management is showing that such a normative approach cannot describe supply chain outcomes that are characterized by bounded rational decisions or objectives different from (expected) profit maximization (e.g., decision makers apply heuristics or care for fairness in the business relationship). The underlying work, therefore, combines methods of mathematical model analysis and experimental economics in order to identify critical assumptions that should be relaxed in existing normative modeling approaches in order to test the external validity of the proposed models.