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Cooperation enforcement in ad hoc networks with penalty

机译:临时网络中的合作执法

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To facilitate the multi-hop communications in mobile ad hoc networks, all the nodes in the networks need to cooperate and relay packets for other nodes. Unfortunately, there exist selfish nodes that may refuse to relay packets for others in order to save their own resources such as energy. Those non-cooperative behaviors will lower down the network performance significantly. Therefore, schemes need to be developed to enforce the cooperation of selfish nodes in the multi-hop communications. Credit-based algorithms have been proposed and are considered simple and effective. However, those schemes can lead to unbalanced credit distribution. That is, some nodes in hot areas can easily gain many credits so that they stop relaying for others, while some nodes in cold areas may gain few credits so that they are excluded from the network even if they are willing to cooperate. This paper aims to provide a solution to encourage the nodes in hot areas to stay in the network and help others relay the traffic. We impose a penalty for those non-cooperative nodes in order to force them to participate the communications. To further provide incentive for cooperative nodes to remain cooperative, we propose a game played by the nodes in the same layer. The imposed penalty depends on the outcome of the game. When a node chooses cooperation, the payoff it perceives is the reward from relay minus the cost resulting from the energy loss. When a node chooses not to cooperate, the payoff is the penalty. A node will select the option that generates larger payoff. Simulation results show that our scheme can enforce the nodes in hot areas to cooperate and also encourage cooperative nodes to remain cooperative.
机译:为了便于移动临时网络中的多跳通信,网络中的所有节点都需要协作和中继其他节点的数据包。不幸的是,存在自私节点,可以拒绝用于其他人的中继数据包,以便保存自己的资源,例如能量。这些非合作行为将显着降低网络性能。因此,需要开发计划以强制多跳通通信中自私节点的合作。基于信用算法已经提出,并且被认为是简单且有效的。但是,这些方案可能导致信贷分配不平衡。也就是说,热区域的一些节点可以很容易地获得许多信用,以便他们停止其他人的中继,而寒冷地区的某些节点可能会获得很少的信用,以便即使他们愿意合作,它们也被排除在网络中。本文旨在提供一个解决方案,以鼓励热门区域中的节点留在网络中,并帮助他人中继交​​通。我们对这些非合作节点施加罚款,以迫使他们参加通信。为了进一步提供合作节点的激励,保持合作,我们提出了一个由同一层中的节点播放的游戏。强加的罚款取决于游戏的结果。当节点选择合作时,它感知的收益是继电器中的奖励减去能量损失导致的成本。当节点选择不合作时,收益是罚款。节点将选择生成更大收益的选项。仿真结果表明,我们的计划可以在热区域中强制执行节点,并鼓励合作节点保持合作。

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