首页> 外文会议> >Cooperation enforcement in ad hoc networks with penalty
【24h】

Cooperation enforcement in ad hoc networks with penalty

机译:特设网络中的合作执法有罚

获取原文

摘要

To facilitate the multi-hop communications in mobile ad hoc networks, all the nodes in the networks need to cooperate and relay packets for other nodes. Unfortunately, there exist selfish nodes that may refuse to relay packets for others in order to save their own resources such as energy. Those non-cooperative behaviors will lower down the network performance significantly. Therefore, schemes need to be developed to enforce the cooperation of selfish nodes in the multi-hop communications. Credit-based algorithms have been proposed and are considered simple and effective. However, those schemes can lead to unbalanced credit distribution. That is, some nodes in hot areas can easily gain many credits so that they stop relaying for others, while some nodes in cold areas may gain few credits so that they are excluded from the network even if they are willing to cooperate. This paper aims to provide a solution to encourage the nodes in hot areas to stay in the network and help others relay the traffic. We impose a penalty for those non-cooperative nodes in order to force them to participate the communications. To further provide incentive for cooperative nodes to remain cooperative, we propose a game played by the nodes in the same layer. The imposed penalty depends on the outcome of the game. When a node chooses cooperation, the payoff it perceives is the reward from relay minus the cost resulting from the energy loss. When a node chooses not to cooperate, the payoff is the penalty. A node will select the option that generates larger payoff. Simulation results show that our scheme can enforce the nodes in hot areas to cooperate and also encourage cooperative nodes to remain cooperative.
机译:为了促进移动自组织网络中的多跳通信,网络中的所有节点都需要协作并为其他节点中继数据包。不幸的是,存在自私的节点可能拒绝为其他节点中继数据包,以节省其自身的资源,例如能源。这些不合作的行为将大大降低网络性能。因此,需要开发在多跳通信中强制自私节点协作的方案。基于信用的算法已经被提出并且被认为是简单有效的。但是,这些方案可能导致信贷分配不平衡。也就是说,热区中的某些节点可以轻松获得很多信用,从而停止为其他节点中继;而寒冷地区中的某些节点则可以获取很少的信用,因此即使愿意合作,它们也可以从网络中排除。本文旨在提供一种解决方案,以鼓励热点地区的节点留在网络中,并帮助其他节点中继流量。我们对那些不合作的节点处以罚款,以迫使它们参与通信。为了进一步激励协作节点保持协作,我们提出了由同一层中的节点玩的游戏。施加的罚款取决于比赛的结果。当一个节点选择合作时,它所感觉到的收益是来自中继的奖励减去能量损失所导致的成本。当节点选择不合作时,收益就是代价。节点将选择产生更大收益的选项。仿真结果表明,该方案可以使热点地区的节点相互协作,并鼓励协作节点保持协作状态。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号