Can a Paraconsistent Theorist be a logical Monist

摘要

In recent years, the debate about logical pluralism has been fierce, with challenging arguments being provided by both sides. According to the logical plurals, there are several different logics, hat is, several answers to the question 'Is this argument valid?' (see, e.g., da Costa [1997], and Beall and Restall [2000] and [2001]). On the other hand, according to the logical moist, there is only one logic, that is, only one right answer to the question about the validity of arguments (see, e.g., Priest [2001]). In this paper, I examine the impact of this debate on our understanding of paraconsistent logic. After putting forward a defense of logical pluralism - along the liens articulated by da Costa [1997] -I argue that the best stance for the paraconsistent logician is provided by logical pularalism. After all, paraconsistent theorist is cannot make sense of their own practice in a logical moist setting.