Escape and/or rescue from a submarine is an emergency activity that is undertaken only rarely and, by its very nature, is hazardous. Such operations will naturally attract wide industry and media attention, focusing on both the outcome and the approach taken. A successful escape and rescue mission is the objective, and it is consistent with this to require that such a mission must not unduly endanger the lives of anyone involved. Consequently, the effective safety management of the entire escape and rescue system capability (covering both the equipment and the operations) is essential. An extensive range of equipment is required for the rescue system. For example, a Mother-ship is required to transport the rescue vehicle with its launch and recovery equipment and associated mission support equipment in order to provide a platform for rescue operations. The major elements of the capability (the rescue vehicle, launch and recovery system etc) will normally be expected to have a validated design, be manufactured and maintained in accordance with a classification society's rules (and obtain subsequent certification as such), thereby providing an element of assurance of the inherent safety of their design. However, the interfaces between the equipments that make up the rescue system (for example the rescue vehicle, the launch and recovery system etc), their operation and the operating environment are not covered by classification society rules. Consider the condition of the watertight integrity of the rescue vehicle when it mates with the distressed submarine. This condition is not covered by classification society rules for either the disabled submarine or the escape and rescue system, nor would the particular combination of rescue vehicle with every submarine have been considered in the design process of either component. However, in order for the owner of the rescue system to discharge their safety responsibilities they must be able to demonstrate that this condition has an acceptable level of risk attached to it. This paper reviews the elements that, together, provide a versatile overall capability, and discusses how the safety aspects of this specialist type of capability present some particular challenges. It describes the assurance applicable to equipments that are 'in-class', and suggests how, with correct management of the hazards and risks associated with this intrinsically dangerous capability, the interfaces between the escape or rescue equipments and the disabled submarine can also be proven and reported to be acceptably safe.
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