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Sandia National Laboratories Special Nuclear Material De-inventory Project;Best Practices and Lessons Learned, Final Phase

机译:Sandia National Laboratories特殊核材料去存项目;最佳实践和经验教训,最终阶段

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This paper is the third and final presentation on Sandia National Laboratories' SNM De-inventory project. On May 7, 2004, the Secretary for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) announced the National Nuclear Security Agency's (NNSA) Nuclear Materials Consolidation Initiative. This initiative was established to reinforce national security by consolidating Special Nuclear Material (SNM) from across the nuclear weapons complex. As an early adopter of this initiative, Sandia National Laboratories was directed to remove all Security Category I and II SNM from the Albuquerque, New Mexico location by the end of fiscal year 2007. Sandia identified seven discrete groups of SNM requiring removal in order to meet the objectives and establish Sandia National Laboratories as a "non-enduring" SNM site for the complex. Planning and preparations began early and continued throughout the project to solve the numerous logistical, operational and political challenges of transferring large quantities of nuclear materials from one site to another. Proper and sustainable transfers of SNM between sites present formidable challenges even under ideal circumstances. Development of transfer/ receipt agreements, safety analyses, packaging certifications, transportation and security solutions under the pressures of an aggressive schedule amplifies these challenges significantly. While many of the core processes to package, ship and dispose of materials are well-established within the DOE Complex, the unique and varied characteristics of Sandia's nuclear materials did not fit neatly within the confines of the typical transfer routines. SNM disposition requirements include material analysis, site receiving agreements, shipping container certifications, packaging hardware development/ procurement, MC&A, safeguards and security requirements, safety authorization basis approvals, and nuclear criticality and radiological safety. Also, basic project management elements including task identification, scheduling, budget, staffing, stakeholder buy-in, and communication must be managed judiciously to ensure project success. This paper summarizes the Sandia National Laboratories SNM De-inventory Project and presents some lessons learned and best practices.
机译:本文是桑迪亚国家实验室SNM去存项目的第三和最终演示。 2004年5月7日,美国能源部秘书(DOE)宣布国家核安全局(NNSA)核材料巩固倡议。该举措成立,以通过巩固来自核武器复杂的特殊核材料(SNM)来加强国家安全。作为这项倡议的早期采用者,桑迪亚国家实验室旨在删除新墨西哥州的阿尔伯克基的所有安全类别和II SNM,到2007年财政年度。桑迪亚确定了七组不需要去除的SNM群体才能删除目标并将桑迪亚国家实验室建立为“非持久性”SNM网站,为复杂的综合体。规划和准备开始于初期,在整个项目中持续解决,以解决将大量核材料从一个网站转移到另一个地点的众多后勤,运营和政治挑战。即使在理想情况下,位点之间的适当和可持续的SNM转移也存在强大的挑战。在积极进度的压力下,开发转移/收据协议,安全分析,包装认证,运输和安全解决方案显着放大了这些挑战。虽然许多核心流程在母鹿复杂地区良好建立,但船舶和处置材料的核心过程中,但桑迪亚的核材料的独特和变化特性在典型转移惯例的范围内并不齐全。 SNM配置要求包括材料分析,现场接收协议,运输集装箱认证,包装硬件开发/采购,MC和A,保障措施和安全要求,安全授权基础批准和核临界性和放射性安全。此外,必须明智地管理包括任务识别,调度,预算,人员配置,利益相关者买入和沟通的基本项目管理元素,以确保项目成功。本文总结了Sandia National Laboratories SNM De-Inventory项目,并提出了一些经验教训和最佳实践。

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