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Oracle Attacks and Covert Channels

机译:Oracle攻击和隐蔽频道

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摘要

In this paper, well-known attacks named oracle attacks are formulated within a realistic network communication model where they reveal to use suitable covert channels, we name oracle channels. By exploiting information-theoretic notions, we show how to modify detection/authentication watermarking algorithms in order to counteract oracle attacks. We present three proposals, one based on randomization, another one based on time delay and a third one based on both randomization and delay.
机译:在本文中,众所周知的攻击名为Oracle攻击的攻击在逼真的网络通信模型中,他们揭示了使用合适的隐蔽频道,我们命名Oracle频道。通过利用信息理论概念,我们展示了如何修改检测/认证水印算法,以抵消Oracle攻击。我们提出三个提案,一个基于随机化,另一个基于时间延迟和基于随机化和延迟的第三个提案。

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