Zero Common-Knowledge Authentication for Pervasive Networks

摘要

Ad-hoc networks and even more intrinsic pervasive networks face huge security lacks. In the most general case entities need to build up a well-defined security association without any pre-established secret or common security infrastructure. Under these circumstances it turns out that without unrealistic assumptions authentication of previously unknown parties is not achievable. However, for a wide spectrum of scenarios much weaker authentication forms are reasonable, e.g., for routing protocols and other protocols aiming to intensify cooperation. Like in real world when foreign subjects meet for the very first time, inferring the opposites identity is impossible. Nevertheless even from this zero common-knowledge status some minor level of trust establishment is possible for both scenarios, in real world and on a technical level. In this paper we will present a very light-weight still provably secure authentication protocol not aiming at inferring the involved entities identities but re-recognizing foreign communication partners whenever necessary. We do not make any assumptions to the scenario, and we also have no requirements for the devices abilities. For the technical realization we propose extremely efficient security primitives applicable for nearly all types of restricted devices. Our solution is more efficient than a public-key operation by some orders of magnitude.